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Résumé / Abstract
Il a été observé que, par rapport au compromis entre les coûts et les
bénéfices du contrôle de la pollution, les entreprises maximisant leurs profits
peuvent choisir de ne pas investir leurs ressources dans la réduction de la pollution
puisque la pénalité imposée par le législateur est considérablement plus faible que
les coûts de l’investissement nécessaire. Récemment, les législateurs se sont engagés
dans une stratégie délibérée qui a pour objet de rendre disponibles, aux agents
économiques (investisseurs et consommateurs), des informations portant sur la
performance environnementale des entreprises. Dans cet article, nous analysons le
rôle que le marché des capitaux joue dans la création de tels incitatifs. Les résultats
obtenus d’études américaines et canadiennes indiquent que le marché des capitaux
réagit à la publication d’information, et que les grands pollueurs sont plus affectés
que les petits. Ces résultats semblent être fonction de la capacité pour le marché des
capitaux de classer et de comparer les entreprises selon leur performance
environnementale et de la crédibilité du législateur quant aux actions coercitives
qu’il peut entreprendre.
It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of
pollution control, profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their
resources in pollution abatement since the expected penalty imposed by
regulators falls considerably short of the investment cost. Regulators have
recently embarked on a deliberate strategy to release information to markets
(investors and consumers) regarding firms’ environmental performance in order
to enhance incentives for pollution control. In this paper, we analyze the role that
capital markets may play to create such incentives. Evidence drawn from
American and Canadian studies indicates that capital markets react to the
release of information, and that large polluters are affected more significantly
from such release than smaller polluters. This result appears to be a function of
the regulator’s willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions as well as
the possibility for capital markets to rank and compare firms with respect to their
environmental performance.
Mots Clés : Environnement, marchés financiers, réglementation
Keywords : Environment, Financial Markets, Regulation
JEL : Q28
11. Introduction
A large number of authors have pointed out the lack of appropriate
monitoring activities and weak enforcement pertaining to the implementation
of environmental regulations.1  Resources devoted to monitoring activities
allow regulators to perform only a limited number of those activities.2  Given
these limited resources, regulators have indicated a desire to direct their
monitoring resources towards those plants most likely to be out of
compliance.3  Moreover, when compliance with the standards is found to be
lacking, it is generally acknowledged that fines or penalties (as imposed by
regulators and courts) are too low (compared to pollution abatement costs) to
act as effective deterrents.4  For example, O’Connor (1994) writes:
In several of the countries studied here,5  the
monitoring problem is compounded by weak
enforcement. In short, when violators of
standards are detected, if penalised at all they
often face only weak sanctions. (...) polluters are
exempted from fines either on grounds of
                                               
1 
 We define monitoring as the set of activities aimed at  verifying the status of compliance
of a specific polluter with the applicable standards; among others, these activities include inspections
of a polluter’s facilities and sampling  (see Magat and Viscusi (1990) for a description of the various
types of inspections undertaken by the USEPA). We define enforcement as the set of actions and
penalties that can be used by a regulator to penalize non-compliance with the regulation. Monitoring
and enforcement together determine the expected penalty of non-compliance with the regulation. A
profit-maximizing firm would compare this expected penalty with  the expected cost of abating
pollution to determine the course of action that maximizes profits.
2 
 Russell (1990)  writes: “What is missing is a commitment of resources to check up on
whether those covered by the law  and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or
forbidden to) them.” (p. 243)
3 
 See Silverman (1990) and Canada (1992). Strictly speaking, such a strategy would
ignore however that the nature and amount of damages caused by a unit of pollution are in most
cases a function of the characteristics of the local environment in which this unit is released. Dion,
Lanoie and Laplante (1997) have shown that in fact the potential for environmental damages partly
explains the regulator’s inspection strategy in the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. Furthermore,
along with Deily and Gray (1991, 1996), they show that monitoring and enforcement activities are
also a function of  variables such as local labor market conditions (e.g. local unemployment rate),
and the visibility of the plant in the local area. 
4 
 See Russell (1990) and Saxe (1989). Fundamental to the penalty is the recovery of any
economic benefit which accrued as the result of the violation of environmental law. The EPA uses a
computer model (called BEN) to estimate a violator’s economic benefit from avoiding compliance. It
is based on an opportunity cost argument: by delaying compliance with the standard, the money that
should have been spent on pollution control can be invested on other revenue-generating activities.
BEN therefore calculates the difference between the present value of compliance versus non-
compliance (see Libber (1991) for more details). It is not clear however that these penalties indeed
recover the economic benefits gained by violators (General Accounting Office, 1991). In Canada, the
recovery of economic benefit is not a common practice (see Ontario, 1993).
5 
 Those being Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia.
2financial hardship or because the violators wield
undue political influence. Perhaps the most
pervasive problem is that, even when fines are
levied, they are frequently so low in real terms
that they have little if any deterrent value. (p.
94)6 
More recently, the USEPA found that some of the largest industrial states
may not be enforcing federal laws governing air and water pollution:
Environmental Protection Agency officials say
they have found that Pennsylvania and some
other big industrial states are reporting only a
handful of major pollution violations, suggesting
that inspectors in those states may be turning a
blind eye to pollution problems. (New York
Times, December 15, 1996)
If indeed the expected penalty for non-compliance, as imposed by
environmental regulators and courts were so low, one would have difficulties
to explain the generally high level of compliance with regulation in
developed countries, and the very large variance in the environmental
performance of plants in developing countries. Hence there must be other
incentives than those provided by regulators and courts that could explain a
polluter’s environmental performance. As such, the potential role and impact
of local communities and markets (including consumers and investors) are
the object of increasing scrutiny.7  Once the role and potential impact of these
agents are properly acknowledged, once the conditions under which the
action of these agents may be effective are identified, fines and penalties
imposed by regulators and courts may not appear to be in many
circumstances the most appropriate or effective incentives for pollution
                                               
6 
 While we do not wish to argue that the experience of these East Asian countries is directly
comparable and similar to the North American experience, there are nonetheless more similarities
than  may appear at first glance. For example, Deily and Gray (1991) have found in the US steel
industry that plants with a higher probability of closing as a result of having to comply with the
environmental regulation are subject to a lesser amount of monitoring and enforcement activities. In
other words, for the purpose of monitoring and enforcement, regulators target plants that may have a
greater capacity to invest in pollution control or pay the fines and penalties associated with being out
of compliance. In  Canada, courts have used a number of mitigating factors to justify the imposition
of small penalties on polluters violating environmental regulations. These include: the accused is a
small company, expressed remorse and desire to avoid similar offenses in the future, has a strong
sense of community in which it takes some pride, may have to shut down the factory with a loss of
jobs and dire and severe financial consequences to the accused and to its employees, etc. (Canada,
1988).
7 
 Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler (1996) have recently developed a new paradigm for controlling
industrial pollution in developing countries which explicitly includes, as sources of incentives, local
communities, and markets.
3control. In fact, the USEPA has recently pointed out that “EPA’s job should
grow from primarily the “enforcer” to include greater emphasis on helping
citizens make informed choices in their daily lives” (EPA, 1991, p.2). 
Hence, while there is a growing concern that fines and penalties
imposed on agents out of compliance are not severe enough to have a
deterrence effect,8  some authors have challenged the conclusion that
polluters therefore have no incentives to comply with environmental
standards. In particular, in view of the increasing facility of access and
exchange of information, markets (both consumers and investors) bear an
increasing amount of attention as to their capacity to generate incentives for
pollution control.9  A significant amount of research and experiments remain
to be performed in order to identify the circumstances under which the
activities of these agents may be effective, the conditions under which the
incentives they generate may substitute for or complement “typical
enforcement practices”, and the proper role of the regulator to empower these
agents. In this paper, our purpose is to discuss and examine how investors
have reacted to the release of public information regarding the environmental
performance of specific plants, as observed and measured by fluctuations on
the stock market.10  While some of this information is revealed through
regular coverage by newspapers, it also includes a deliberate use and release
of information by regulators regarding the environmental performance of
individual plants.
In the next section, we discuss the nature of the role of capital
markets with respect to providing incentives for pollution control. In section
III, we briefly describe the methodology typically used to measure the
reaction of investors to the release of environmental information. In section
IV, we review the results of the studies that have examined the reaction of
investors to the announcement of environmental incidents (such as lawsuits,
fines, accidents, etc.), or list of polluters (e.g. Toxics Release Inventory). We
                                               
8 Russell (1990) writes: “Efforts to monitor regulated behavior appear to have been
inadequate to the task - a very difficult task in many instances - and typical enforcement practices
appear to have been insufficiently rigorous.” (p. 243; italics ours). On the difficulty of the task, see
General Accounting Office (1987, 1993, 1994).
9 
 While the current paper focuses exclusively on the role of information to generate
incentives for pollution control, the ever greater easiness of access to information suggests numerous
other applications. For example, the medical license board of Massachusetts now gives public access
to disciplinary records and malpractice histories of physicians in the state; it has also been suggested
that airlines give public access to their safety records: number of crashes, safety violations, etc. (The
Economist, January 11, 1997); the Government of Philippines is currently putting in place a rating
system to compare and publicly reveal the performance of concessionaires providing water supply to
the various quarters of  Manila.
10 A related but different question of interest is whether or not firms with good
environmental performance have a higher market valuation than plants with bad environmental
performance, other things being equal. On analysis of this nature, see Cormier et al. (1993) and the
references therein.
4also present the results of a new study that examines the reaction of investors
to the publication of lists of firms in British Columbia that either fail to
comply with environmental regulations or that are of concern to the Ministry
of the Environment of British Columbia. We conclude in section V.
2. The role of capital markets
Unanticipated events, or new information may lead capital markets
to revise their expectations regarding the profitability of an enterprise.
Changes in markets values thus provide estimates of changes in the net
present value of expected profits as a result of the event, or new information,
relative to the situation where the event would not have occurred or the
information would not have been available.
It has been argued earlier that penalties imposed by regulators and
courts are generally set too low to act as effective deterrents and prevent
violation of environmental regulations. For example in the United States, the
EPA pursues civil enforcement actions (as opposed to administrative
penalties or criminal enforcement actions) to respond to the more serious or
recalcitrant violators. In FY1990, civil penalties totalled $ 61 329 237
imposed in 1 400 cases, for an average penalty of $ 43 806. In FY1991, civil
penalties were $ 72 835 251 in 1 419 cases; the average penalty increased to
$ 51 330. The average penalty imposed under the Clean Water Act has
steadily increased since 1986 to reach $ 405 436 in 1991. The maximum
civil penalty imposed in FY1990 was $ 15 000 000 and $ 6 184 220 in FY
1991.  In Canada, data on the number of prosecutions, convictions, and
penalties are sparse and not necessarily comparable across provinces.11 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that penalties in Canada are typically
much lower than in the United States. In Alberta, 14 prosecutions were
initiated by the Attorney General’s Office in 1990; total fines levied were $
37 275 against 8 companies. In Ontario, total fines levied increased from $
605 668 in 1985-86 to $ 3 633 095 in 1992. Given the number of
convictions, average penalties increased from $ 9 330 to $ 14 250. Despite
the increase (as noted by Saxe, 1989), fines remain low. In British Columbia,
79 convictions were obtained over the period April 1 - September 30, 1992;
average fines were then slightly less than $ 3 000.12  More recently, over the
period October 1 1995 to March 30 1996, total fines of $ 219 200 were levied
in British Columbia on 116 convictions for an average of less than $ 2 000
(the maximum fine was $ 20 000 and there were 59 fines of $ 500 or
smaller). Criminal actions, in which the regulator typically seeks
imprisonment of the defendant(s), remain rare events.
                                               
11 Upon completing an extensive study of the environmental regulation in the Canadian
pulp and paper industry, Sinclair (1991) writes “the data available on prosecutions are limited”
(p. 102).
12 Environment Policy and Law, March 1993.
5Given the small size of those penalties, markets are more likely to
revise their estimates of the present value of a firm only to the extent that the
information leads them to revise their expectations regarding future
production costs (including the pollution control costs) or the ability of the
firm to generate revenues at the levels originally expected. It is interesting to
note that this information may concern solely a given enterprise or may
directly or indirectly allow a comparison of the environmental performance
of an enterprise to the performance of other firms (such as lists of firms
ranked in one way or another by their environmental performance).
Information of both nature, which we may call individual information and
collective information respectively, may affect expectations regarding
production costs and revenues. However, we would argue that individual
information is more likely to have a relatively larger impact on expectations
of production costs (as opposed to revenues), while collective information is
more likely to have a larger impact on expectations of revenues (as opposed
to production costs).
Indeed, in most cases individual information takes the form of an
announcement of an event that is generally not favourable to the enterprise
such as a violation of regulation, the announcement of an incident causing
damages to the environment (such as a spill), the announcement of a lawsuit
against the enterprise, etc. As mentioned earlier, given the size of the
penalties imposed by courts and regulators, it is unlikely upon such an
announcement, that changes in market values, if any, would solely reflect
expectations regarding the size of a potential penalty. These changes are
more likely to reflect expectations that the firm may  be the target of closer
scrutiny and further enforcement actions, that citizens and community
groups may pressure the firm to reduce its emissions (even below
environmental standards), and as a result that it may have to invest large
resources (financial and others, e.g. time) in pollution control. We would
therefore expect changes in market value, if any, to be larger (potentially
much larger) than traditional penalties imposed by courts and regulators.13  A
further question of interest therefore is whether or not these large observed
changes in market value, caused by the provision of new information,
provide enough incentives for investments in pollution control.
While individual information may also lead consumer groups to
boycott the good(s) produced by the enterprise, thus leading to a revision of
the expectations on future revenues, the degree of substitution that is taking
place may be limited due to the absence of information regarding the
environmental performance of other enterprises. On the contrary, collective
information which compares firms with bad performance to those with good
                                               
13 Though in a different context, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) found that capital markets
penalizes producers of recalled drugs and cars far more than the direct costs.
6performance is more likely to allow this substitution to take place since it
gives an alternative to those consumers who wants to substitute away from
the firms with a bad environmental performance. Moreover, since pollution
efficiency is often associated to overall production efficiency,14  collective
information indirectly (and perhaps imperfectly) allows a comparison of the
overall efficiency of the enterprise. This explains why we expect collective
information to have a greater impact on expectations of future revenues than
individual information. 
Whether or not markets react to the release of new information
regarding the environmental performance of firms (whether individual or
collective information) remains ultimately an empirical issue. In the next
section, we briefly discuss the methodology used to measure market
reactions. In section IV, we present a number of empirical studies and
discuss the results of those studies in view of the hypotheses developed above.
3. Event-study methodology
The methodology used in this field of research is akin to event-study
analyses which is based on the assumption that the capital market is
sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of new information (events) on
expected future profits of the firms.15  The reaction to the announcement of
an event is obtained by predicting a “normal” return for each firm during an
“event window” (usually the day prior to the event, the day of the event, and
a number of days after the event), and then subtracting this predicted normal
return from the actual return observed on those days following the
announcement of the event. Normal returns are generated by estimating a
version of the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM):16 
(1) R R R eit i ft i mt it= − + +( )1 β β
where Rit  is the rate of return on security i for day t; Rft is the rate of return
on a risk-free asset; Rmt is the rate of return of a market index (such as the
Dow Jones market index); bi is the estimated parameter; and eit is the error
term for security i on day t. The CAPM model is estimated for each firm over
                                               
14 See Porter and van der Linde (1995).
15 The methodology was originally developed by Fama et al. (1969) and Fama (1976). This
methodology has been used to analyze the reaction of investors to numerous events of a different
nature: product liability suits (Viscusi and Hersch,1990), airline crashes (Borenstein and
Zimmerman, 1988; Chance and Ferris,1987), workplace safety violations (Fry and Lee, 1989), etc.
Henderson (1990) notes that in 1987 and 1988, 14 event studies were published in the Journal of
Finance, and 26 in the Journal of Financial Economics. 
16 A number of alternative models can be used to test the robustness of the results (for
example, the single-index market model or the market adjusted returns model). Typically, these
alternative tests yield results of a similar nature as those obtained by using CAPM. See Henderson
(1990) for further details and discussion.
7a number of days before the event window (usually between 120 and 210
days).
In absence of unexpected information, the relationship between the
firm's return, the market's return and the return of the risk-free asset should
be unchanged. Hence, these returns can be used to forecast the normal return
for the firm. A prediction error is generated when unexpected information
affects the return for the firm without affecting the market's return and the
risk-free asset’s rate of return.  The prediction error, commonly referred to as
the abnormal return (AR) for security i at time t (ARit),  is computed as the
following:
(2) AR R R R Rit it ft i mt ft= − − −$ ( )β
The day the event is announced is referred to as day 0, and all other days are
measured relative to day 0. The average abnormal return is then computed
across firms:
(3) AAR N ARt t it
i
N t
=
=
∑( / )1
1
where Nt is the number of securities in a given subsample. A statistical test
(t-test) is then used to determine the level of significance of abnormal returns
for a given subsample. The test uses the estimated standard error of the
returns computed for the estimation period:
(4) t AAR s AARt t= / $( )
where $( )s AARt  is the estimated standard error of abnormal returns during
the estimation period.
4. Empirical analyses
Following these lines of argument, a number of papers have
investigated, using the event-study methodology, how capital markets can
provide incentives for pollution control.  Muoghalu et al. (1990) examine the
impact of environmental enforcement measures related to the American
RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) and the Superfund Acts
on firms’ financial value. Their sample consists of 128 initial lawsuits
against firms and 74 case settlements (involving a fine) announced in the
print media (generally the Wall Street Journal) between 1977 and 1986. The
event-study results indicate that stockholders suffer on average a statistically
significant loss of 1.2 percent in market value at the filing of the lawsuit,
with no significant abnormal returns at the disposition of the suit.
Interestingly, they compute that the abnormal losses due to announcements
8of lawsuits translate into an average loss of 33.3 million $ in equity value.
Given the small penalties typically imposed by courts and regulators, this
result confirms our hypothesis that losses of market value, if any, are likely to
be significantly larger than the traditional penalties.
Lanoie and Laplante (1994) perform a similar analysis with 9
announcements of lawsuits and 13 announcements of suit settlements in
Canada during the period 1982-1991.  Interestingly, they find results that
contrast with those of Muoghalu et al.; i.e., they observe abnormal losses
between 1.65% and 2% when the firm is found guilty (and fines are
imposed), but no losses when lawsuits are initiated. This difference may be
due to the conciliating approach that Canadian environmental authorities
have traditionally adopted in comparison with their American counterparts
(see Marchant, 1990). As pointed out earlier, it is also interesting to note that
the recovery of economic benefits realised as a result of non-compliance is
not a common practice in Canada while it is explicitly incorporated in the
assessment of penalties in the United States. The fact that Canadian
shareholders do not react to the announcement of lawsuits may indicate little
or no worry as to the outcome of the legal procedure, while American
environmental authorities seem to have been more successful in designing
enforcement mechanisms in which a lawsuit can impose a credible threat on
investors. Note that the information used in these two studies would classify
as individual information.
In contrast with the preceding research, two studies have analysed
the deliberate provision of information to the markets (by regulators or third
parties), and its impact on firms’ value. This information is based on
rankings of polluters and can thus be qualified as collective information.
Shane and Spicer (1983) use studies conducted by the Council of Economic
Priorities (CEP) of firms’ environmental performance in four industries
(paper, power, steel, and oil) to analyse the reaction of investors to the
release of the results of those studies. They examine eight studies released by
the CEP between 1970 and 1975. They find that firms’ market value is
adversely affected by the release of this information. Perhaps more
interestingly, they also find that firms identified as serious polluters suffered
greater loss of market value than those with a better ranking. Given these
results, these authors conclude that investors use the information to
discriminate between companies on the basis of their environmental
performance records.
Hamilton (1995) examine how financial markets have reacted to the
first edition of the “Toxic Release Inventory” (TRI) in June 1989. The TRI
reports information on manufacturing facilities, with 10 or more employees,
that produce or use above a threshold amount of chemicals on a list of over
300 toxic chemical substances identified by EPA. For each chemical, the
facility submits a form listing releases to the environment broken down by
emission pathways: air, land, underground injection, etc. Furthermore, the
9TRI data contains information on facility name and parent ownership so that
media coverage can link operating facilities with their parent company.
Firms are ranked from large to small polluters on the basis of their absolute
levels of emissions, thus allowing a direct comparison of their environmental
performance.
The event-study conducted by Hamilton is based on a sample of 436
enterprises reporting TRI pollution figures. Unsurprisingly, most of these
enterprises (75% of the sample) are in the manufacturing sector (chemicals,
paper, primary metals, petroleum and textiles) with 12% in the chemical
industry. Results show that these firms experienced negative, statistically
significant abnormal returns between 0.2 and 0.3 % upon the first release of
the information. These abnormal returns translated into an average loss of
$4.1 million in stock value on the day the pollution figures were released,
with firms in the primary metals industry experiencing a smaller loss of
market value (presumably because these firms were already perceived as
large polluters by the market). He also find that the larger the number of
chemicals a firm reported to produce or handle at its facilities, the larger the
loss the firm suffered in its market value: for each additional chemical,
Hamilton measures a loss of $236,000.17  While we are not aware of any
studies linking a firm’s loss of market value, as a result of TRI, with its
environmental performance, these results nonetheless partly support former
EPA director’s claim that “(...) the Toxics Release Inventory is fast becoming
one of the most powerful tools we have to reduce toxic emissions.” (New
York Times, October 13, 1991)
New results
Since July 1990, every six months or so the Ministry of the
Environment of British Columbia (BC, Canada) publishes a list of polluters
identified into two categories: (1) firms that are currently not complying
with an environmental standard or permit; and (2) firms that are of concern
to the Ministry because their environmental performance is near the
regulatory threshold, or because their level of pollution is abnormally high in
a sector of activity which is not regulated.  Since these lists do not provide a
ranking of enterprises, and do not allow for a comparison of their
environmental performance, we classify this information as individual
information.
In the following, we examine the impact of the first five lists of
polluters on the equity value of firms appearing on these lists. Our analysis
complement that of Hamilton (1995) in two different ways: (1) it is based on
a Canadian list providing a different set of informations than those released
                                               
17 Referring to the TRI, J.S. Naimon of the Investor Responsibility Research Center is
quoted as saying: “(...) companies that emit a lot of toxic waste do not have good financial
indications in the long term.” (New York Times, October 13, 1991)
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in the TRI; and (2) we investigate how investors treat the information about
firms appearing successively on more than one list, while Hamilton focused
exclusively on the first release of the TRI.
Table 1 presents a list of 19 firms quoted on the stock market and
appearing on any of these first five lists. This table shows whether a firm has
been identified as “out-of compliance” or as “of concern”. Furthermore, it
indicates that multi-plants firms may appear more than once on the same list
if many of their plants are either non-complying or of concern.
We use the SIMM (single-index market model) version of the
standard event-study technique to analyze investors’ reaction to the
publication of the lists.  A three days event window (DAY -1, DAY 0 and
DAY +1) is considered, where DAY 0 refers to the publication date of the
list18 .  We first look at the whole sample of firms appearing on each list. 
Then, we examine more specifically the firms that are of concern versus
those that are out-of-compliance, and the firms that have appeared once on a
given list versus those that have appeared several times. Finally, to
investigate how investors react to successive appearances on different lists,
we perform an analysis in which only firms that appeared on all lists
(whether being of concern or out-of compliance) are considered.
Table 2 reports the results obtained using the whole sample of firms
at the publication of each list. There is no statistically abnormal loss on any
day of the event window for any of the list. Contrary to what was observed by
Hamilton (1995) and Shane and Spicer (1983), this suggests that appearing
on the BC polluters’ list has no impact on a firm’s equity value.
A number of reasons may explain this result. First, it may be that
BC’s lists of polluters do not provide new or unexpected information to
investors. Canada is a much smaller market than the United States, with only
a very few large public enterprises. The first release of the TRI provided a set
of detailed information on releases of a large number of severe pollutants,
information more likely to be unknown to the investors than that provided by
the BC list. Moreover, it is important to note that in any given list, the
Ministry of the Environment does not systematically report all firms out of
compliance or of concern ot the Ministry. A firm may be out of compliance
(or of concern) and yet never appear on the lists, or appear only after a
number of lists have been published: not being listed is not necessarily an
indication of good environmental performance. As we have noted before, this
feature of the BC’s lists of polluters do not allow investors to rank firms
according to their environmental performance. Furthermore, given the
characteristics of the economy of British Columbia, unsurprisingly the
companies listed in BC’s lists are mostly in the primary sector (resources) of
                                               
 
   
18 Certain companies were discarded in the analysis because of confounding events such as an 
announcement of dividend pay-off, profits, merger, take-over or new share emissions.
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the economy; therefore, any potential decline in demand resulting from an
adversarial reputation effect may be less important than in Hamilton's sample
which covered firms in a broader set of activities. Finally, investors may
believe that appearing on BC’s lists does not represent any significant threat
for the companies involved. Given our earlier discussion, the difference
between the American results and those presented here may again indicate
that American environmental authorities have been more successful in
designing policy mechanisms that create a credible threat for firms.
Table 3a and Table 3b provide a more detailed analysis in which
different categories of firms are distinguished. In Table 3a, firms that are
out-of-compliance and those that are of concern are analyzed separately. One
could expect that firms out of compliance would be under a more important
threat than those of concern. On the other hand, the fact that firms are of
concern for the environmental authorities could be new information to the
market; this could have more impact on the value of firms reported under
this heading. As shown in Table 3a however, no statistically significant
abnormal losses can be detected in either category. 
In Table 3b, we distinguish between firms that appear once on a
given list and those that appear more than once. One would expect that for
environmental authorities, the pressure to take actions against a polluter may
be "cumulative" so that firms appearing more than once on a given list could
experience more important abnormal losses. The results seem to confirm this
hypothesis. Indeed, we obtain statistically abnormal losses on day -1 and day
+1 for firms appearing more than once on the second list: -0.1 % on day -1
and -1 % on day +1. Such abnormal negative returns for firms appearing
several times on the second list may indicate that investors required strong
signals about a firm’s bad environmental performance before revising the
expected value attributed to this firm.
Table 4 provides further evidence that investors may have reacted in
the way we just described.  In this Table, we consider a sample of firms that
have appeared on every list so as to investigate how investors handle the
information contained in successive appearances on the list. There were two
such firms. Again, the only significant abnormal loss appears for the second
list on day +1 (a loss of 2 %) suggesting that investors needed strong
indications before changing their expectations.  No abnormal losses beyond
the second list may mean that appearing on the list has a once-for-all effect,
and that successive appearance does not provide significant new information.
5. Concluding remarks
It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of
pollution control, profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their
resources in pollution abatement since the expected penalty imposed by
regulators falls considerably short of the investment cost. This however
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ignores that markets and communities can also create incentives for pollution
control to the extent that they possess information regarding a polluter’s
environmental performance. Regulators have recently embarked on a
deliberate strategy to release information to markets (investors and
consumers) and communities regarding firms’ environmental performance in
order to enhance incentives for pollution control.
In this paper, we analyze the role that capital markets may play to
create such incentives. Evidence drawn from American and Canadian studies
indicates that capital markets react to the release of information, and that
large polluters are affected more significantly from such release than smaller
polluters. Hence, regulatory agencies can use, in addition to traditional
regulatory measures, information-oriented approaches so as to harness the
power of communities and markets to put pressure on polluters. This result
however appears to be a function of the regulator’s willingness to undertake
strong enforcement actions (United States Vs Canada), as well as the
possibility for capital markets to rank and compare firms with respect to their
environmental performance (Council of Economic Priorities and TRI Vs
British Columbia’s lists of polluters).
Further research in this area will indicate the circumstances under
which the release of information can create incentives for pollution control
by empowering the agents that can bear pressure on polluters. In particular,
current research will indicate whether or not capital markets in developing
countries can create incentives for pollution control.19  Further research
should also indicate whether or not this information not only has an impact
on market valuation, but ultimately whether or not it affects a polluter’s
environmental performance.
                                               
19 
 Research is currently taking place in Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, and
Philippines.
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Table 1: Public enterprises identified in the lists of polluters
ENTERPRISES LIST 1 LIST 2 LIST 3 LIST 4 LIST 5
12-07-90 12-12-90 22-07-91 24-01-92 06-10-92
Alcan Aluminium Ltd. c,pp 1 c,ppp c,p c,p c,p
B.C. Sugar Refinery Ltd. p p c,p c,p c,p
Canadian Pacific Forest Products Lt.d c,p c,p c c c
Canadian Pacific Ltd. - - - - -
Canfor Corp. - - - - -
Cominco Ltd. c,ppp c,pp cc,pppp ccc,ppp c,ppp
Equity Silver Mines Ltd. p - p - -
Flectcher Challenge Canada Ltd. Ccc cc c c c
George Weston Ltd. c c c - -
Imperial Oil Ltd. (Esso Petroleum Canada) c c,p cc c -
International Corona corp. c c c c -
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. c,ppp c,ppp ccc cccc cccc,p
Methanex Corp. - - - - -
Noranda Inc. p p p p p
Placer Dome c p c c -
Repap Entreprises Inc. c c c c -
Shell Canada Ltd. - - cc,pp - c
Westar Group c,pp - - - -
Westmin Resources Ltd. p p c - p
1 
 The number of letters indicate the number of times that the enterprise appeared on the list
p: plants not complying with pollution standards c: plants of concern to the Ministry
Table 2: Whole sample results
DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1
LIST Size of
t. stat t. stat t. stat sample
L1 0,0017 0.003 00026 13
(0,543) (0,9199) (0,8381)
L2 0,0037 0,0029 -0,005 12
(0,7146) (0,5623) (-0,9373)
L3 -0,006 0,0033 -0,009 7
(-0,7932) (0,5623) (-1,27)
L4 -0,007 -0,004 0,0006 7
(-0,8972) (-0,5353) (0,0084)
L5 0,0018 0,0042 -0,01 10
(0,2756) (0,6684) (-1,527)
Table 3a
Plants out of compliance Plants of concern
DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1 DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1
LIST Size of Size of
t. stat t. stat t. stat sample t. stat t. stat t. stat sample
L1 -0,002 0,01486** 0 4 0,0179* 0,0064 0,0097 3
(-0,2694) (2,123) (0,05831) (1,92) (0,6777) (1,033)
L2 0,0079 -0,004 0,0039 4 0,01014 0,01277 -0,003 4
(1,028) (-0,5575) (0,5074) (1,11) (1,399) (-0,3323)
L3 -0,002 -0,0125 0 4 -0,0136 0,0026 -0,0308 1
(-0,1111) (-0,6513) (-0,0341) (-0,2761) (0,0538) (-0,656)
L4 0,01149 -0,007 -0,009 2 0,0015 -0,004 0,0056 1
(0,7123) (-0,4538) (-0,532) (0,1043) (-0,2595) (0,3896)
L5 -0,002 0,0013 -0,007 4 -0,003 0,0013 -0,0144 3
(-0,265) (0,1528) (-0,8416) (-0,2965) (0,1351) (-1,485)
* Statistically significant at the 90% level.
** Statistically significant at the 95% level.
Table 3b
Firms appearing once Firms appearing more than once
DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1 DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1
LIST Size of Size of
t. stat t. stat t. stat sample t. stat t. stat t. stat sample
L1 0,0048 0,011096* 0,00406 7 0,00381 0 -0,0022 6
(0,7902) (1,814) (0,6622) (0,5021) (-0,051) (-0,2851)
L2 0,0086 0,00263 0,0009 7 -0,0011* 0 -0,01091* 5
(1,333) (0,4052) (0,1426) (-1,677) (-0,007) (-1,712)
L3 -0,003 -0,01159 -0,0035 4 -0,0067 0,006 -0,01012 3
(-0,1426) (-1,6174) (-0,1885) (-0,8977) (0,7953) (-1,347)
L4 0,0059 -0,0053 -0,001 2 -0,01183 -0,004 0,0009 5
(0,5241) (-0,4748) (-0,05241) (-1,38) (-0,4156) (0,1042)
L5 -0,003 0,0017 -0,01026 7 0,015537 0,0091 -0,0039 2
(-0,4383) (0,2495) (-1,504) (1,501) (0,8876) (-0,3767)
* Statistically significant at the 90% level.
** Statistically significant at the 95% level.
TABLE 4
ENTREPRISES APPEARING ON THE FIRST FIVE LISTS
DAY -1 DAY 0 DAY +1
LIST
t. stat t. stat t. stat
L1 0,004622 0,002476 0,011362
0,4706 0,2519 1,149
L2 -0,00592 0,008302 -0,020457**
-0,571 0,8019 -1,969
L3 -0,010403 0,009997 -0,014264
-1,079 1,034 -1,48
L4 -0,01294 -0,0044 -0,00159
-1,145 -0,3889 -0,1407
L5 0,009816 0,024394* -0,00933
0,7527 1,893 -0,7249
* Statistically significant at the 90% level.
** Statistically significant at the 95% level.
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